Hannah Arendt's Jewish writings were central to her thinking about the human condition and engaged with dialectics of modernity, universalism and identity. Her concept of the 'conscious pariah' attempted both to define a role for the public intellectual and understand the relationship between Jews and modernity. Controversially she accused Jews of lack resistance to the Nazis and argued that their victimization resulted from apolitical 'worldlessness'. We argue that although Arendt's analysis was original and challenging, her characterization of Jewish history as one of 'powerlessness' is exaggerated but, more importantly, her underdeveloped concept of 'the social' is insensitive to the complex modalities of resistance and consciousness among subaltern Jewish communities. Further, her lack of interest in religious observance obscures the importance of Judaism as a resource for resistance. This is illustrated by 'hidden transcripts' of Jewish resistance from the early modern period.
In recent years Arendt's Jewish writings have received extensive attention and commentaries have brought out the richness of this work -from her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, through debates about Zionism in the 1930s to Eichmann in Jerusalem and the ensuing controversy in the 1960s. Indeed, for Kohn (2007: xxvii) ' her experience as a Jew is literally the foundation of her thought'. These commentaries have also revealed how her 'Jewish' works and her wider political philosophy were interconnected and interdependent such that one strand in her work cannot properly be understood apart from the others. This discussion begins with a critical account of Arendt's concept of the 'conscious pariah' which is central to her understanding of the dilemmas of Jewish emancipation, her early Zionism and her concept of political action. The concept was closely connected to other strands in her work. Secondly, her concept is grounded in her critique of 'wordlessness', that is, a refusal to engage with political action and choosing instead living with mystical utopias. This concept drew on Max Weber's description of Jews as ein Pariavolk and debates in German sociology about the origins of capitalism but was also informed by her political existentialism. This discussion examines these issues and introduces evidence of everyday resistance among Jews in early modernity in which the Jew could be understood as a subaltern figure. We argue that this evidence points to ambivalent relations between Jews and the wider community that are more complex than Arendt's essentially figurative dichotomy of the pariah/parvenu suggests. The discussion concludes by arguing that the concept is limited by her underdeveloped concept of the social combined with an exaggerated stress on autonomous political action, which was not sensitive to multiple modalities of resistance in the lifeworld.
Pariah, Parvenu and 'the Jewish Question'
Arendt's concepts of political action and Jewish identity were framed by the nineteenth century (particularly German) 'Jewish Question' and subsequently by the Holocaust. She was part of the generation of Jewish intellectuals, including Adorno, Horkheimer and Bauman, traumatized by the Zivilisationsbruch and who, as Ron Eyerman (2013) argues, were deeply affected by the violence that breached taken-for-granted realities. Although not included in Eyerman's account, Arendt was similarly witness to the catastrophe that, he says, leaves wounds and memory scars that influence later behaviour in unpredictable ways 2 . Documenting the extermination of Jews in occupied Europe, Arendt concluded that the inevitable choice, including for those such as herself, who escaped, was to resist or die 3 and, '[if] you are no longer willing to die for anything, you will die for having done nothing' (Arendt 2007:163) 4 . These comments encapsulate Arendt's call to Jews (and indeed all subaltern peoples) to abandon both accommodation with gentile society and the Diaspora condition of 'worldlessness'. Jews must become instead 'conscious pariahs', willing to fight and organize politically as Jews -to demand rights that were not conditional upon abandoning Jewishness -an attempt that was anyway doomed to failure.
Arendt's rather Simmelian vignettes of the parvenu and pariah were developed with reference to the 'Jewish Question' in nineteenth-century Europe
5
. The French Revolution and Napoleonic edicts of Emancipation had offered civic rights, although this was a 'hope and curse at same time' (Sznaider 2010: 430) . Clermont-Tonnere, Constituent Assembly deputy, defined the terms of emancipation when he stated in 1789 that Jews were 'welcome as individuals' but 'there will be no nation within a nation', thereby excluding Jews from the nation state as Jews (Dreyfuss 2012). Arendt agreed with Gershom Scholem that European nations were thus not prepared to assimilate Jews without demanding that they alter their identity beyond recognition (Biale 1982:5) . 'Jews were', Arendt says therefore 'socially speaking, in the void' (Arendt 1968: 14) . Their position in the social hierarchy was quite different from the inequality of the class system because it arose from their relationship to the state through which Jews were either 'over-privileged ' and protected or underprivileged (1968:14) .
Arendt's understanding was framed by a wider view of Jews in Christian society. Her Jewish writings are characterised by a largely unacknowledged distinction that, following Nirenberg (2013) and Judaken (2012) one might call a figurative, imaginary Judaism, as opposed to the 'sociological Jew'. Imaginary Judaism serves as a trope in western Christian and Enlightenment thought and originates in the dichotomy between Christian spirituality and Jewish corporeality being 'of the flesh' of Abraham. Further to 'Judaize' was to make an erroneous passage from 'soul to flesh', 'spirit to matter', 'truth to appearance' in which even converted Jews were often suspected of being crypto-Jews (Nirenberg 2013:57ff) . This dispute with figurative 'Judaism' has been deployed to place Jews in a category of alterity while serving as a foil to legitimate Christian and later Enlightenment views. While for Christianity figurative Judaism was an enemy of revelation, for the philosophes and then for Hegel and Kant it was an enemy of reason (Nirenberg 2013:343) . In a further twist, the image of Judaism was transmuted after the French Revolution by counter-revolutionaries such as Burke and Romantics like Fichte into the epitome of materialistic modernity. Here the outcome of the revolution would be the triumph of 'Judaism' in the forms of money- . Further, he argues that since Jews can be emancipated politically without abandoning Jewishness, political emancipation is not identical with human emancipation (Marx 1977:51) . While the essay can be read as supporting Jewish legal emancipation (e.g. Fine 2014) and 'political emancipation is of course a great progress' (Marx 1977:47) this is also limited to rights within the bourgeoislegal state that in due course will give way to full 'human' emancipation. What space there would then be for cultural particularity is unclear.
Arendt's position was ostensibly the reverse of this in that for her Jews must insist both on their 'right to have rights' while engaging politically as Jews. Hence her often-quoted maxim, 'If one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German, not as a world-citizen, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man' (Arendt 2000:12) . Indeed, for Arendt 'rights' are meaningless without the guarantee of collective will to defend them. In this sense Durkheim's 'solution' to the Jewish Question after Dreyfus -the institutionalization of human rights as a new sacred object which would permit both social solidarity and the respect of difference (Durkheim 1973 ) -could not be Arendt's solution. This was because for her 'rights' are always both inclusive and exclusive -they include those possessing right but exclude stateless, superfluous populations that grow in contemporary society. Rather as Agamben later argued, the logic of sovereignty coincided with the logic of exclusion and ban, since rights are bound up with the political entity of sovereign people (Lysaker, 2014) .
However, 'to be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all' (Arendt 1979: 475) .
The twentieth century had shown that there was no guarantee of rights and that the utopia of assimilation had failed 8 . Although Arendt's concept differed from Marx's, the stereotypes of Jews noted above were not completely absent from her work either and it is not always clear whether she too is referring to figurative or actual Judaism. She links the alleged passivity of Diaspora Jews to their being materialistic, deceitful and lacking historical ties; their pursuit of individual advantage and seeking the protection of gentile authorities to which they were obsequiously grateful; and becoming 'court Jews' avoiding politics. Indeed, these 'parvenus' shared 'inhumanity, greed, insolence, cringing servility and determination to push ahead' (Arendt 1979:66) . They embraced the status offered them by gentile society as 'exceptions' and thereby internalized antisemitism (1979:56) . This is, to say the least, a figurative caricature 9 and raises questions about the pariah-parvenu couplet, as the next section argues.
Despite such apparent 'success' though, the position of the parvenu is impossible. This is explored furthest in Arendt's biography of her alter-ego, Rahel Varnhagen, begun in 1933 and finally published in 1956 with two additional chapters written with hindsight as to the fate of European Jews. Rahel's story epitomised the absence of collective political struggle for rights and how 'Jews did not … want to be emancipated as a whole; all they wanted was to escape from Jewishness, as individuals if possible' and only failures and 'shlemihls' were left behind (Arendt 1974:6-7) 10 . The lesson of Rahel's story is that 'to play a part in society [i.e. bourgeois salon society]' nineteenth-century Jews 'had no choice but to become parvenus par excellence' and Rahel played this part to the full (1974:209) . She found in the end though that the parvenu 'will become something' they 'did not want to become' who 'has to acquiesce to everything ' (1974:215 (Birnbaum 2008:223) . Rahel realized at the end of her life that her 'liberation' from Jewishness had come at the cost of self-alienation. This Jewish dilemma was expressed later by Bauman (1988) in terms of 'exit visas' from 'national and corporate' existence but without 'entry tickets' into the societies in which they lived. The emerging constitutional nation-state both claimed adherence to universal principles of rights but was legitimated by claims to national identity, which for Jews created a double dilemma. There was a conflict between the 'offer' of universalist citizenship versus the particular identity of Jews as a 'nation' whose loyalty to the state would always be in question, but also between the nationalist foundation of the state versus the alleged Jewish cosmopolitanism.
The parvenu fails also because of the modern paradox that the more assimilated Jews are the harder it becomes to define their 'foreignness', yet Jewishness becomes an inextricable putative essence. Hence '[i]nstead of being defined by nationality or religion, Jews were being transformed into a social group whose members shared certain psychological attributes and reactions, the sum total of which was supposed to constitute "Jewishness"' (Arendt 1979: 66) . This essence was 'hidden' among those who adopted gentile customs Arendt further drew on Lazare's concept of ambivalent pariahdom that had characterised Jews in exile after the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE) -'Thus, on the one hand, unwillingly, the Jews were unconscious auxiliaries of Christianity while, on the other hand, they were its enemies, for which there were numerous reasons' (Lazare 2005:45) . Also following Lazare, pariah status was ultimately their responsibility. While their 'isolation has been their weakness ' (2005:23) , legal emancipation freed pariahs from servitude but Jews themselves had to overcome their self-oppression and break the chains which they had 'forged themselves ' (2005:180) . In the modern state pariah status was actually intensified by their 'teachers and guides' who united to keep them in a 'state of servitude more complete than the ancient bondage of Egypt ' (2005:333) . By refusing Enlightenment then, Jews remained the Other of reason.
Arendt developed Lazare's concept but as a largely figurative-literary aesthetic dichotomy of the pariah and parvenu. Like Rahel, the parvenu lives in self-abjection and inauthenticity, allowed a temporary economic role in Christian society which is politically powerless (as for Weber) as war profiteers, hired tax collectors and adjuncts of developing European capitalism (Weber, 1967:336-55) . The way of the pariah and parvenu are, Arendt claims, 'equally ways of extreme solitude' because the pariah regrets not having become a parvenu and the latter has a bad conscience at having 'betrayed his people and exchanged equal rights for personal privileges' (Arendt 1979: 66) . The pariah is 'worldless', that is, apolitical and withdraws from engaging with the politics of the dominant society. The unpolitical, worldless, non-public character of the community was defined by the demand that it should form a 'body, whose members were to be related to each other like brothers of the same family. The structure of communal life was modelled on the relationships between the members of a family because these were known to be non-political and even antipolitical' (Arendt 1998:53-4) . By contrast the 'world' is the 'in between', the interaction between people and experiences of living together in a public sphere as a space of appearances 11 .
They jointly exercise the capacity to think and take charge of history, although this is under threat as the 'public' increasingly becomes the 'mass' (Arendt 2002:235-6) . Freedom is 'never to let oneself be bound by what one is' or by a 'mirror in the other' (Arendt 2002:93) and worldliness not feeling 'at home' in the world -being in the world but not of it (Chacón 2012 Both writers were critics of Jewish assimilation but for Scholem the apparent conservatism of Judaism disclosed radical cultural social forces and heretical and revolutionary impulses that arose in messianism. The 'hidden tradition' has many layers (Sznaider 2011: 26) but
Arendt agreed with Scholem that in the seventeenth-century Sabbatian movement mysticism turned towards political action but after its failure 'the Jewish body politic died' and led to nihilism (Arendt 2007:310) . However, while for Scholem the concealed tradition remained hidden in Kabbalah and mysticism, Arendt adopted a more secular concept of political action and was disdainful of religiously expressed identity. Suchoff (1997) notes that Arendt viewed Scholem's account of the mystical tradition as both too particularly
Jewish and as a source of dangerous passivity -something both 'beautiful' but also a 'great disaster'. The self-conscious pariah by contrast is one who lives with difference and distinctness in such a way as to establish her difference publicly. The self-conscious pariah requires visibility, requires to be seen 'as other' (Benhabib 1995) that only an outsider embodies the humanity that society otherwise denies (Rabinbach 1999) . As with Lazare, the conscious pariah will rouse fight against all domination and will be rejected by antisemites and conventional Jews. According to Rabinbach (1999) the self as pariah lives in the authentic awareness that only an outsider embodies the humanity that society otherwise denies. caused by them -although the 'double pariah' (as both Jew and rebel) were responsible for their own fate. If they fail to rebel they become a schnorrer, a beggar who props up the social order, perhaps not unlike Marx's dismissal of the Lumpenproletariat as 'knaves' (Marx 1977: 316) . Thus despite her differences with Sartre (e.g. Bernstein 1996:47-8 and 195-7) there is an echo here of the authentic redeeming heroic deed like Mathieu's moment of existential choice when, in the face of the defeat of the French army, he sacrifices his life to hold the German advance by fifteen minutes (Sartre 1970:225) . For Arendt too the authenticity of the act seems more important than its effectiveness.
It follows then, for Arendt, that 'Every pariah who refused to be a rebel was partly responsible for his own position' (Arendt, 2007:77) of humanity rather than permit them to ape gentiles or … play the parvenu' which is a treacherous promise of equality (Arendt 2007:275 express the nomadic sensibilities and vulnerabilities of the modern era, and are thus precursory [sic] to the post-modern nomadic identities of a refugee, a vagabond, a tourist, etc'. But the situations of refugees, vagabonds, tourists and whoever else are hardly comparable (beyond the trite observation that they are all in some sense 'mobile') and these sensibilities refer to nothing in particular about the Jewish condition. Differentiation and social complexity are crucial to Arendt's understanding of political resistance but for a writer in whose work the 'in between' was a central idea, there is little sense of the complexity of moral choices and political action. Arendt drew a clear line between the social as a space of passivity and discrimination (as in her 'Reflections on Little Rock') versus the public as one of equality and action (Hammer 1997 ). Yet if this distinction in Jewish history is wrong then perhaps, as Benhabib (1996:166) suggests, the 'despised terrain of the social'
could 'become the scene of repoliticization'. Further the ethic of resistance might admit multiple forms of everyday social practices that are embedded in alternative cultural identities, even if they do not manifest as overt heroic opposition. In this sense Scholem's understanding of 'hidden' resistances might be more valid than the overly polarized division of the social and public in Jewish history. (Momigliano 1980:177) .
Further, the depiction 'pariah' is not consistent with the level and type of continual interaction between Jewish and majority societies. As Zolkos (2014) points out, the analogy with the Hindu caste system does not work because there the pariahs were excluded and untouchable and the Brahmins were not looking to them for legitimation. Figurative Judaism was needed as a liminal and an ambiguous figure against which Christianity defined itself but as we will show below Judaism was also an oppositional subaltern against which Christianity defined itself as spirit versus the body of Jewishness.
Eisenstadt (2009) Cain, Isaac over Ishmael, Jacob over Esau and Joseph over his brothers (Biale 1986:38) .
Defeats and exile came to be seen as signs of God's power but also an opening up of human activity that rejected humiliation and subservience and allowed the advocacy of militant action, such as the revolts of 115-17 CE in the Roman Diaspora, and the Bar Kokhba rebellion (132-35 CE). Although defeated, these revolts were not futile, Biale argues, and resulted in the restoration of some autonomous self-government under rabbis and the Arendt's public-private distinction coincides with that between authenticity and passivity.
The social hides responsibility and undermines the capacity for action in a private world of thoughtlessness and habit (1998:29). The limitation of Arendt's analysis arises in part from her concept of the social in which she contrasted the social private realm with the political realm of public action and never celebrated any transgression of the public and private (Pitkin 1998). Indeed, there are, as Benhabib (1995) argued, several layers to Arendt's concept of the social, but in relation to self-conscious resistance the concept of the social is undeveloped. The experience of worldlessness was expressed in her depiction of the social as 'the Blob' -something insidious, unimaginative and threatening, which as Pitkin (1998) argues, recalls the portrayal of threats in 1950s science fiction films. The emergence of society occurs with the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices and from 'the shadowy interior of the household' enters 'the light of the public sphere', where it has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, but has also changed 'almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen ' (1998:38) . The rise of mass society, on the contrary, indicates that the various social groups have suffered the same absorption into one society that the family units had suffered earlier. With the emergence of mass society, the realm of the social has 'reached the point where it embraces and controls all members of a given community equally and with equal strength'. But society then 'equalizes under all circumstances', the victory of which in the modern world is 'recognition of the fact that society has conquered the public realm, and that distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual ' (1998:41) . The consequence of this is generalized worldlessness where our 'capacity for action and speech has lost much of its former quality since the rise of the social realm banished these into the sphere of the intimate and the private ' (1998:49) . Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else, of sheer survival, assume public significance (1998:46) . This can be illustrated by recent research (Deutsch, 2010; Diemling 2011 and 2015; Elyada 2012) focusing on examples from the early modern period. This period is relevant here since for Arendt it was the period of the formation of the market and state and therefore of 'society'. The rise of the social resulted in the blurring of the distinction between the private and the public -so it was not merely a prelude to the modern but its epitome (Arendt, 1998:160-61) . Research on the texts of the sixteenth-century convert, Anthonius The 'Red one', Edom, was historically a reference to ancient Rome but here to sixteenth-century Christendom.
 The Alenu Prayer, part of the daily liturgy, was from the twelfth century onwards a 'kind of anti-Christian credo' (Yuval: 2006, 119) While it is true that these examples come from a pre-secular universe they contradict the claimed passivity of Diaspora Jewish life and add nuance to Arendt's grammar of action.
Outside the intimidating gaze of power, a sharply dissonant political culture is visible embedded in everyday practices of the lifeworld. Drawing on Goffman's analysis of front and back stage performances, James Scott (1990) 
Conclusion
Arendt's concept of the conscious pariah has a prophetic aspect -a potential reversal of the statues of both the pariah and parvenu that has been important in understanding the politics of resistance. Further, her anti-individualism points towards forms of collective action rather than a republic of individuals although in the process the public sphere operates as a kind of utopia the potentiality of which was never realized. These concepts were rooted in anger and despair at the fate of European Jewry and the growing 'worldlessness' of the world. However, the dichotomy of the pariah/parvenu does not encompass the complexity of Jewish-Christian relations but more particularly it inadequately understands the dynamics of resistance. Further, the pariahdom from which she would emancipate Jews is a combination of sociological and figurative constructions, which are in turn related to Arendt's underdeveloped concept of the social, which is a realm of privacy as opposed to the public realm of political action. The distinction between the figurative and sociological Jew does not mean the former is unreal, on the contrary it has real consequences.
2
The term 'witness' is used cautiously here -these writers were not directly witnesses to the mass extermination, however, Arendt was imprisoned in Camp Gurs in 1940 and those who did not escape were eventually deported to death camps. Arendt was then survivor of a process that she documented from the 1930s.
3
Of those who escaped she said, 'They must remember that they are constantly on the run, and that the world's reality is actually expressed by their escape… [the] personal strength of the fugitives increases as the persecution and danger increase'. (Arendt 1968) 4 In 1942 she said, 'The extermination of the Jews of Europe … is about to begin. The murder of five thousand Jews in each of the cities of Berlin, Vienna and Prague is to mark the start of this mass slaughter (2007:162; and again pp 191-2 and pp 214-7). It is not often noted that Arendt publicised the genocide while the Allies were still dismissing evidence of them.
5
There are other similarities between Arendt and Simmel's understanding a society of strangers mediated by money (see Birnbaum 2004:123-68 This is a charitable way of putting it. Laqueur (2001) claimed that Arendt had read 'too much antisemitic literature for her own good'.
10
Shlemihl (Yiddish) is an awkward, unfortunate person.
11
It might be thought that the concept of the public used here is anachronistic but it follows Arendt's usage of the term as a sphere of speech and action that pre-dates modernity where, actually it is increasingly compromised.
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It is fashionable to regard Arendt as now an 'anti-Zionist' (e.g. Butler 2014) but her relationship with Zionism was complex. Her insistence on the impossibility of assimilation had resonance with Hertz's view of the inevitability of antisemitism. Similarly, Zionists dismissed Diaspora history as passive and impotent 'ghost people' adopting a posture of kiddush ha-shem, allowing oneself to be killed for the sanctification of God. She became more critical of Zionism in the 1950s, though ambivalently so, thus Parvikko's (1996:170) claim that Arendt 'was never a Zionist' does not bear scrutiny.
13
In the same passage he accused Arendt of lack of Ahavat Yisrael (love of the Jewish people). 14 Scholem also saw Kafka's stories as allegories of the Jewish condition, although it is unclear to what extent K in The Castle was a pariah or parvenu -he had contempt for the peasants in whom he has 'no interest ' (2009:26) and was obsessed with entry into the castle.
15
There were of course other reasons for the controversy. Her concept of 'banality of evil' and claiming that Eichmann was no fanatical antisemite still provoke controversy while her account of the trial omits witness testimonials, which endowed the trial with historical significance. But consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Hilberg (1961: 16-17) had written of the failure to resist as an 'alleviation-compliance response' and similarly Arendt wrote of 'Diaspora mentality' that was indifferent to survival or death.
17
In 1947 Malchiel Gruenwald who lost 52 relatives in Auschwitz accused Rudolf Kastner, a Hungarian lawyer, journalist and later Israeli civil servant, of collaborating with the Nazis in Hungary. Kastner sued for libel but the judge ruled in Gruenwald's favour. Kastner was assassinated in Tel Aviv in March 1957. Parts of the verdict were overturned by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1958.
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Anthonius Margaritha was a sixteenth-century Jewish Hebraist and convert to Christianity. He was a source for Martin Luther's conception of Judaism. The texts of converts (also including Victor of Carben, Johannes Pfefferkorn and Ernst Hess) were designed to convey negative images of Jews to Christian audiences but for our purposes serve to illustrate daily resistances to pariah status. 19 Anthonius Margaritha, Der Gantz Jüdisch Glaub, Augsburg 1530, fol. G1v-G2r. 20 Margaritha, Der Gantz Jüdisch Glaub, fol. DGJG, V4r-v.
